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 1 
LIMITING LEGISLATIVE COURTS: PROTECTING ARTICLE III  
FROM ARTICLE I EVISCERATION 
Kenneth G. Coffin 
INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution states, “[t]he judicial power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”1  Article III judges “shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour”2 and serve at the will of neither the  
executive nor the populace.  The Constitution even protects the Article III judiciary 
from Congressional diminution of salary, lest the legislature seek to subvert     
judicial independence indirectly.3  The powerful, unitary federal judiciary of the 
1787 Constitution sprung directly from the founding generation’s pre-revolutionary 
experiences, which led them to charge King George III with making “judges     
dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their office, and the amount and  
payment of their salaries.”4  Following independence from the Crown, Alexander 
Hamilton eloquently emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary to a 
nation still debating acceptance of the Constitution.5 
Founding sentiment aside, as with the notion of a unitary executive6 or a       
limited commerce clause,7 hope for a single federal judiciary has fallen by the  
 ________________________  
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.   
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (stating judges “shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their continuance in Office.”). 
 4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”). 
 6. Article II of the Constitution, mirroring Article III, states that “[t]he executive power of the United 
States shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1.  The unitary 
executive theory argues that this specific grant of the executive power entails that the President necessarily has 
complete and sole control over all agencies or individuals executing the laws.  This theory has been firmly rejected 
by the Supreme Court.  See e.g. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding the Ethics in      
Government Act, which forbid the President or his Attorney General from removing an Independent Counsel save 
for “good cause”).  But see id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To repeat, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution 
provides: ‘The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.’ As I described at 
the outset of this opinion, this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”)   
(emphasis in original).   
 7. See e.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that the power to regulate interstate 
commerce extends to intrastate activities impacting interstate commerce and explicitly adopting the aggregation 
principle); U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941) (overturning Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), 
and refusing to invalidate the Fair Labor Standards Act on the basis that Congress was using its commerce clause 
power in a field covered by the police power of the states).  These opinions effectively ended the Court’s decades 
long effort to limit Congress’s commerce power.  But see U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (identifying 
only “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power” and holding the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional).  
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wayside.  Since 1828, the Supreme Court has recognized a separate class of     
“legislative courts.”8  Judges of these legislative, or Article I, courts fall outside the 
guarantees of Article III.  Congress may therefore provide for limited terms of  
office, disparate methods of appointment and reduction of salaries.  Currently, 
there are over 2,000 Article I judges, including Bankruptcy, Magistrate,9 and    
Administrative Law judges,10 just to name a few.  In contrast, only 829 United 
States judges can claim Article III protection.11  In a nation partially founded on a 
belief in judicial independence, the vast majority of federal judges operate without 
constitutional protection.  Of equal importance, it is quite likely that the vast 
amount of Americans’ only contact with the federal judiciary will come before an 
Article I tribunal.   
If we are to take the writings of the Framers seriously; if we believe there     
exists an important relationship between Article III and judicial independence; 
what limits should be placed on the creation and proliferation of Article I courts?  
Over the past century, with the rapid expansion of the administrative state and  
concomitant increase in administrative law judges, the Supreme Court has      
struggled to articulate a limiting principle.  As noted above, this is not the only 
field where such a principle has proved illusory.  It seems once the Court          
recognizes a Congressional power, that power defies control.12 
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Oil 
represents an important attempt to articulate a uniform theory for limiting        
Congress’ power to create Article I courts.13  The Northern Pipeline plurality 
sought to clearly enunciate when the Constitution requires a court to meet Article 
III’s requirements, setting out three discrete exceptions to the presumption of    
Article III applicability.14  In dissent, Justice White attacked Justice Brennan’s neat 
 ________________________  
 8. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (holding territorial 
courts constitutional even though they did not comply with Article III).   
 9. As of 2006, there were 352 bankruptcy judges and 496 full-time magistrate judges.  See DANIEL J. 
MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS 3 (2d. ed. 2006). 
 10. In 1984 there were 1,121 administrative law judges.  See Judith Resnick, The Mythic Meaning of  
Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 582–83 (1985).  Rather than adjusting this number, probably upward, 
to reflect the continued expansion of the administrative state, I left it unchanged.  As such, the number 2,000 
represents an extremely conservative estimate of the current number of Article I judges. 
 11. The breakdown is as follows: 9 Supreme Court Justices, 179 judges of the Courts of Appeal, 632  
District Court judges.  See MEADOR, supra note 9, at 3.  There are also 9 judges on the Court of International 
Trade.  United States Court of International Trade, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov (click the “About the Court” 
hyperlink followed by the   “Composition of the Court” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).   
 12. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.  This does not mean that the Court has given Congress 
carte blanche.  Quite to the contrary, the Court’s oft-conflicting struggle with this issue has helped produce the 
current confusion in this area of the law.  Compare O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (holding 
the courts of the District of Columbia constitutional courts created under Article III and thus exempted from any    
Congressional diminution of salary) with Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (reversing O’Donoghue 
and holding that judges of the District of Columbia fall outside Article III).    
 13. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-89 (1982) (plurality opinion).     
 14. Id. at 63-64 (holding that there exist three exceptions to the presumption that all federal courts must 
accord with Article III).   
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exceptions, eschewing the search for a workable bright line rule and arguing     
instead for a balancing test.15 
Justice Brennan’s opinion calls upon the judiciary to articulate a workable 
theory to limit Congressional use of legislative courts.  As such, this paper will 
analyze possible limitations on Congress’ Article I power, concluding that        
separation of powers jurisprudence offers a practical and appropriate manner in 
which to check Congressional overreach. Part I traces the development of        
Congress’ power to create Article I courts.  Part II critically evaluates the Northern 
Pipeline opinions, ultimately finding neither Justice Brennan’s nor Justice White’s 
conflicting opinions satisfactory.  Part III briefly discusses several possible limiting 
principles on Article I courts before concluding that separation of powers          
jurisprudence offers a meaningful and pragmatic solution to the problem.  Part IV 
tests the practicality of this new separation of powers test, applying it to both trial 
level bankruptcy courts and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels to illustrate both its   
accommodative and limiting capacity.  This paper concludes by emphasizing the 
importance of protecting the integrity of judges individually and the judiciary   
writ-large from Congressional evisceration.  
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE COURTS 
The incremental growth of this area of the law has led to a mass of conflicting 
precedents, which makes studying the development of this constitutional debate 
particularly important.  This history continues to shape modern doctrine and     
defined both Justice Brennan and Justice White’s opinions in Northern Pipeline.   
A.   The Beginning: Canter and Murray’s Lessee 
The terse Article III holdings of Canter and Murray’s Lessee continue to hold 
disproportionate sway over modern case law.  Importantly, these cases deal only 
tangentially with the issue of Article III courts.  These veritable asides either ignore 
or fail to comprehend the complexities they entail. 
In Canter, the Supreme Court confronted for the first time the constitutionality 
of federal courts that fail to comply with Article III.  Canter deals with the validity 
of the Superior Court of the territory of Florida.16  The Superior Court had assented 
to the sale of salvaged goods and Canter claimed the sale violated Article III of the 
Constitution because the judges lacked the protections of Article III.17  Chief    
Justice Marshall’s opinion only ancillarily deals with the Article III issue.  He   
predominantly focuses on justifying the power of the federal government to deal 
with inhabitants of Florida as it sees fit.18  Chief Justice Marshall cursorily states, 
 ________________________  
 15. Id. at 115 (White, J., dissenting) (“The inquiry should, rather, focus equally on those Article III values 
and ask whether and to what extent the legislative scheme accommodates them or, conversely, substantially  
undermines them.”).  
 16. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 541-46 (1828). 
 17. Id. at 541-42. 
 18. Id. at 546.  
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“[t]he Judges of the Superior Courts of Florida hold their offices for four years.  
These Courts, then, are not Constitutional Courts.”19  Such courts are “incapable” 
of receiving the “judicial powers conferred by the Constitution.”20  Rather than rule 
them unconstitutional, however, Chief Justice Marshall creates a new category of 
“Legislative Courts” justified by “the general right of sovereignty, which exists in 
the government.”21 
Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between the “judicial power” vested by 
the Constitution in Article III courts and the powers conferred by Congress on  
legislative courts.  In this deceptively simple way, Marshall avoided the strictures 
of Article III and allowed Congress greater flexibility in dealing with the           
territories.  Problematically, Marshall’s simplicity begs two important questions.  
First, what is the difference between the “judicial power” of constitutional courts 
and the power of the legislative courts?  Second, what is the limit on this non-
constitutionally derived judicial power?  Marshall responds that while Article III 
restricts Congressional creation of legislative courts in the states, “the same      
limitation does not extend to the territories.  In legislating for them Congress    
exercises the combined powers of the general and state governments.”22  By its 
own terms, Canter applies only to the territories. Problematically, by                 
simultaneously failing to define the judicial power of the United States and     
granting Congress the power to create non-Article III federal courts, Marshall left 
open the question of when else Congress need not comply with Article III.  
In Murray’s Lessee, the Plaintiff, a customs collector in New York, challenged 
the assessment of a lien on his property by the Treasury Department as a violation 
of Article III and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.23  He argued that 
the decision to issue a distress warrant against his property constituted a judicial 
act, requiring use of the judicial power of the United States.24  As such, only an 
Article III court had the power to assess the lien, rendering the assessment by the 
Treasury Department invalid.25  Justice Curtis, writing for the court, combines the 
two arguments and focuses primarily upon the due process claim.  Citing summary 
proceedings in England following the Magna Carta, the Court states that while 
“‘due process of law’ generally implies . . . trial according to some settled course of 
judicial proceedings . . . this is not universally true.”26  Based on this English 
precedent, the Court holds that Treasury procedures lacking the trappings of a   
typical court proceeding do not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court then passed to the second question presented, “whether those      
provisions of the constitution which relate to the judicial power are incompatible 
with these proceedings?”27  While “auditing the accounts of a receiver of public 
 ________________________  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Murray v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).   
 24. Id. at 274.  
 25. Id. at 274-75. 
 26. Id. at 280.  
 27. Id. 
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moneys may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act,” the mere “exercise of     
judgment upon law and fact” does not “bring such matters under the judicial    
power.”28  Rather, it must be shown that the “subject matter is necessarily, and 
without regard to the consent of congress, a judicial controversy.”29  The Court 
answers the first question in the affirmative.  As to the second question, Justice 
Curtis argues that while “there can be no doubt that the mere question, whether a 
collector of the customs is indebted to the United States, may be one of judicial 
cognizance,” the federal government’s sovereign immunity means they must    
consent to such a suit.30  Thus, there exists a class of “public rights, which may be 
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and 
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may 
not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem 
proper.”31 
Murray’s Lessee created the so-called “public rights doctrine,” which states 
that since the federal government need not open itself up to suit, if it chooses to do 
so, it need not select a traditional Article III forum.  Despite carving out this     
exception to Article III, the majority attempts to limit the extent of its holding,  
stating that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, 
from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or          
admiralty.”32  Moreover, the Court explicitly relies upon the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, which only includes cases involving the federal government.  Read 
without proper context, however, the term public rights may seem to lack          
definition.  This has allowed for the expansion of the doctrine and opened the door 
for a far more extensive erosion of Article III.33   
These two nineteenth century cases continue to shape modern law and form the 
cornerstones of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Northern Pipeline.  However, despite 
their prominence, both cases admit of multiple interpretations.  This has resulted in 
over a hundred years of confused interpretation and an expansion of the doctrine of 
legislative courts. 
 ________________________  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).  
 30. Id. at 283-84. 
 31. Id. at 283-84 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See e.g. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-90 (1985) (citing Glidden Co. 
v.  Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962)).  “In essence the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding 
that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively decided by the 
Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced.”  Thomas, 473 
U.S. at 589 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (plurality      
opinion).  
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B.  Pre-Northern Pipeline Twentieth Century Case Law 
Interestingly, aside from forming the basis for the creation of legislative courts, 
Canter and Murray’s Lessee also begat two intertwined, 34 but separate, lines of 
case law.  Synthesis, however, remains elusive. 
1. Canter and the District of Columbia 
In two twentieth century cases the Supreme Court dealt with whether the courts 
of the District of Columbia fall under Article III.  In these cases the Court used two 
opposing interpretations of Canter.   
In 1933, the Supreme Court confronted an Article III challenge to               
congressional diminution of the salaries of the judges of the Court of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.35  The President appointed the 
judges of these courts with the advice and consent of the Senate.36  In 1932,     
Congress passed the Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932, which      
provided for the reduction in salary of all retired or active judges, “except judges 
whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished.” 37  The   
Department of Justice reduced the salaries of the judges of the District of          
Columbia, prompting the judges to sue. 
The judges argued that they were Article III judges exempted from salary    
diminution by the express wording of both the statute and the Constitution.38     
Justice Sutherland discussed at length the important link between Article III and 
judicial independence, stating, “it is not extravagant to say that there rests upon 
every federal judge affected nothing less than a duty to withstand any attempt,  
directly or indirectly in contravention of the Constitution, to diminish this        
compensation.”39  Turning to Canter and its progeny,40 the Court states, “[a]     
sufficient foundation for these decisions in respect of territorial courts is to be 
found in the transitory character of the territorial governments.”41  In that view, 
Canter relied primarily upon the “impermanent character”42 of the territorial     
governments which were “destined for admission”43 into the Union. 
Having characterized Canter as allowing Congress to regulate only for       
transitory governments, Justice Sutherland contrasts such governments with the 
 ________________________  
 34. Court discussion of the interplay between the military and Article III stands in marked contrast to this 
general trend and has remained largely distinct.  See e.g., United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (holding 
that Congress’ Article II power over the military would not support military tribunal jurisdiction over soldiers 
following their discharge from the military).   
 35. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).   
 36. Id. at 525. 
 37. Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-212, §§ 105-07, 47 Stat. 382, 401-02 (1932). 
 38. O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 527-28. 
 39. Id. at 533.  
 40. Id. at 535-36 (collecting early nineteenth century cases in accord with Canter).  
 41. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).  
 42. Id. at 538. 
 43. Id. at 537. The holding of territory permanently, without plan for admission into the Union,           
presumably did not occur to Justice Sutherland.   
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District of Columbia.  He concludes that the courts of the permanent seat of the 
national government cannot fall under Chief Justice Marshall’s exception to Article 
III.44  The Constitution makes “an unqualified grant of permanent legislative   
power” to Congress, making the grant of power over “local affairs . . . subordinate 
and incidental.”45  On the other hand, “Congress possesses ‘the combined powers 
of a general and of a state government,”‘46 echoing the “general right of            
sovereignty”47 mentioned by Marshall in Canter.  The Court avoids this striking 
similarity, however, arguing that it was the “purely provisional”48 nature of       
territorial courts that rendered them “incapable of receiving” the judicial power of 
the United States.49  O’Donoghue redefined Canter, focusing upon the transitory 
nature of the territorial governments, rather than the extent of Congressional    
power.  I term this the “transitory interpretation” of Canter.  
In contrast, in Palmore v. United States the Supreme Court held the newly 
created Superior Court for the District of Columbia a legislative court not subject 
to Article III.50  The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1970 removed the judicial structure at issue in O’Donoghue, replacing it 
with courts of more limited and local jurisdiction.51  Under Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion, the powers and jurisdiction of the court meant little.  As illustrated 
above,52 Justice Sutherland focused exclusively upon the permanency of the      
District as the seat of the federal government.  Nonetheless, the Palmore court  
declined to follow O’Donoghue. Ignoring the ratio underpinning Justice            
Sutherland’s opinion, the court distinguished Palmore on the basis of the Superior 
Court’s decreased jurisdiction; quoting Justice Sutherland’s statement that the D.C. 
Courts, “were ‘of equal rank and power with those of the other inferior courts of 
the federal system.’”53  Eschewing context, the Palmore court argued that 
O’Donoghue rested upon the powers of the old District of Columbia Courts.54   
Having distinguished seemingly contradictory precedent, Justice White       
analogized the power Congress held over the District of Columbia to the power 
they held over the territories and concluded that Congress had plenary power to 
create legislative courts in D.C.  The Court goes through painstaking historical 
detail noting, without need or disagreement, that an Article III judge need not   
preside over every case involving an Act of Congress.55  In the end, the Court’s 
 ________________________  
 44. Id. at 538.  Indeed, he does so with marked fervor: “How different are the status and characteristics of 
the District of Columbia!” Id.  
 45. Id. at 538-39.  
 46. Id. at 539 (quoting Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 147 (1889)).  
 47. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). 
 48. O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 544. 
 49. Id. (quoting American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828)).  
 50. 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973).   
 51. Id. at 392; see also id. at 392 n.2 (describing the changes in the court structure brought about by the 
1970 Act).  
 52. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.  
 53. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 405-06. 
 54. Id. at 406.  
 55. Id. at 400-01.  “It is apparent that neither this Court not Congress has read the Constitution as requiring 
every federal question arising under the federal law . . . be tried in an Article III court before a judge enjoying 
lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction.”  Id. at 407.  
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decision turns upon the similarity between Congress’ power over the district and 
their power over the territories.  In essence, the Palmore court held that Congress 
possessed the full police power with respect to the District of Columbia.  This falls 
directly in line with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Canter and rejects the  
importance of the relative permanence of courts or governments.  I term this the 
“sovereignty interpretation” of Canter.  
These two cases, both involving the D.C. courts, illustrate the profound        
dissonance and confusion plaguing this area of the law.  While the Palmore court 
adhered more closely to the holding of Canter, it also failed to grasp (or            
intentionally misstated) the holding of O’Donoghue.  Either way, this points to a 
serious doctrinal problem plaguing the Canter strand of pre-Northern Pipeline  
doctrine.   
2.  Development of the Public Rights Doctrine56 
As discussed above, based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity Murray’s 
Lessee held that where the government voluntarily waives its sovereign immunity 
and consents to suit, Congress may provide an Article I forum for the suit.57   
In Williams v. United States (decided on the same day and written by the same 
Justice as O’Donoghue), the Supreme Court began the process of unhinging the 
public rights doctrine from the theory of sovereign immunity.58  In Williams, a 
judge of the Court of Claims sued for the same reason as the two judges in 
O’Donoghue—diminution of salary in contravention of the Constitution.59  Justice 
Sutherland first traces the history of the Court of Claims which, “from nothing 
more than an administrative or advisory body, was converted into a court.”60  He 
then holds the Court of Claims a legislative court.61 
The Williams majority seems to rely on two justifications, prior case law       
determining the Court of Customs Appeals a legislative court in Ex Parte Bakelite 
and the sovereign immunity of the United States. 62  This, however, is judicial 
sleight of hand.  Bakelite relied heavily upon the Court of Customs Appeals’ 
mandate to “examine and determine claims for money against the United States.”63  
As such, “none of the matters made cognizable by the court inherently or          
necessarily requires judicial determination,” because Congress was not required to 
allow citizens to sue the government for debts owed.64 
 ________________________  
 56. A full exposition of the Public Rights doctrine is well outside the scope of this paper, nonetheless its 
importance requires a brief overview of the doctrine as it stood prior to Northern Pipeline. 
 57. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.  
 58. 289 U.S. 553 (1933). The Court heard oral arguments in Williams and O’Donoghue on April 12, 1933 
and handed down the decisions on May 29, 1933.   
 59. Id. at 559.  
 60. Id. at 565.  
 61. Id. at 570. 
 62. Id. at 568-72 (citing Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929)).  
 63. Id. at 568-69 (citing Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929)).  
 64. Id. at 569. 
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Justice Sutherland then moves on to discuss sovereign immunity, holding that 
“since Congress [may] confer upon an executive officer or administrative board, or 
an existing specially constituted court, or retain for itself, the power to hear and 
determine controversies respecting claims against the United States, it follows  
indubitably that such power” is not part of the Article III judicial power of the 
United States.65  This succinct statement accords precisely with Murray’s Lessee.  
Problematically, the court also includes language open to a more expansive      
reading, stating that for matters “equally susceptible of legislative or executive 
determination . . . the authority to inquire into and decide them may                  
constitutionally be conferred on a non-judicial officer or body.”66 This               
ambivalence in Williams, which subtly expanded the possible reach of the public 
rights doctrine, has continued to this day.  Indeed, in Northern Pipeline Justice 
Brennan declines to give a precise definition of a “public right,” though he argues 
“a matter of public rights must, at a minimum, arise ‘between the government and 
others.’”67   
The foregoing case law illustrates the state of flux, if not outright discord,   
confronting Justice Brennan as he attempted to create a workable limit on        
Congress’ power to create Article I courts. 
II. THE NORTHERN PIPELINE DECISION 
In Northern Pipeline, the Court tangentially confronted Congress’ power to 
create legislative courts, and both the plurality and the dissent took the chance to 
articulate their visions of Article III’s limiting power.68  The facts, however,    
probably called for a more limited ruling.  The case arose out of Northern        
Pipeline’s (“Northern”) petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978.69  After filing for reorganization, Northern filed suit against Marathon Oil 
(“Marathon”) for “alleged breaches of contract and warranty, as well as for alleged 
misrepresentation, coercion and duress.”70  Marathon moved to dismiss on the 
grounds that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 “unconstitutionally conferred Article III 
judicial power upon judges who lacked . . . tenure and protections against salary 
diminution.”71 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 greatly altered the structure of bankruptcy       
proceedings in the United States.72 In pertinent part, the Act establishes           
 ________________________  
 65. Id. at 580-81.  
 66. Id. at 579-80. 
 67. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. at 50, 69 (1984) (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite 
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
 68. Id. at 50-118. 
 69. Id. at 56.  I will draw upon the plurality opinion for the facts of the case, as the facts are not in dispute.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 56-57.  
 72. Justice Brennan outlines these expansive changes in depth.  See id. at 52-57.  For the entire Act, see 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 declared unconstitutional by N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87.  The jurisdictional sections of the Act at issue in Northern Pipeline are also available.  
See id. at §241(a). 
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bankruptcy judges as “adjuncts” to the District Court.73  Bankruptcy judges served 
for 14-year terms and could be removed from office for incompetency, misconduct, 
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability by their circuit’s judicial counsel.  
Along with these changes in name and rank came changes in power.74  The Act 
greatly broadened bankruptcy court jurisdiction, which now included “all civil  
proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11.”75  At least theoretically, this new grant of power also included 
state law claims.  Marathon specifically attacked the bankruptcy court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the state contract claim.  The bankruptcy judge denied the       
motion,76 but the District Court granted it,77 prompting the United States to       
intervene and appeal to the Supreme Court.  Northern proposed two arguments 
supporting the constitutionality of the Act.  They claimed that the Bankruptcy Act 
was a proper exercise of Congress’ Article I power to create legislative courts or, in 
the alternative, that bankruptcy judges were adjuncts of the District Court and 
therefore not subject to Article III. 
A. The Plurality Opinion: Justice Brennan’s Grand Vision 
According to Justice Brennan, “[t]he question presented is whether the          
assignment by Congress to bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted in 28 
U.S.C. § 1471 violates Article III of the Constitution.”78  Before answering this 
question, Justice Brennan lays out two fundamental premises: first, the Framers 
expressly structured the Constitution to avoid the accumulation of power in the 
hands of the few;79 second, the judiciary must remain independent of the Executive 
and Legislative branches to ensure balance in our constitutional system.80  Article 
III ensures judicial independence by defining the power of the judiciary and      
protecting judges from the political or economic influence of the coordinate 
branches.  “In sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental 
principle—that the ‘judicial power of the United States’ must be reposed in an  
independent Judiciary.”81 
In response to Marathon’s argument that the 1978 Act created properly       
constituted legislative courts, Justice Brennan lays out his unified theory of Article 
 ________________________  
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976 ed. Supp. IV) declared unconstitutional by N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. 
at 87. 
 74. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a)–(b) (1976 ed. Supp. IV) declared unconstitutional by N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 
458 U.S. at 87. 
 75. 28 U.S.C § 1471(b) (1976) declared unconstitutional by N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87. 
 76. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 57 (citing In re N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 6 B.R. 928, 931 (Bankr. 
Minn. 1980)). 
 77. Id. (citing In re N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 B.R. 946 (D. Minn. 1981)).  
 78. Id. at 52.  
 79. Id. at 57 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)). 
 80. Id. at 58 (“The Federal Judiciary was therefore designed by the Framers to stand independent of the 
Executive and Legislature . . . .”) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 
1888)).  
 81. Id. at 60 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III § 1). 
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III.82  He states that the case law illuminates “three narrow situations not subject to 
[Article III], each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of power to the 
Legislative and Executive branches was historically and constitutionally so       
exceptional” that the creation of the legislative courts did not endanger “the      
constitutional mandate of separation of power.”83  Those three exceptions are: the 
sovereignty interpretation of Canter; courts-martial; and the public rights          
exception.84   
Justice Brennan explicitly adopts what I term the “sovereignty” reading of 
Canter.85  He notes that in the territories “Congress was to exercise the general 
powers of government.”86  Having adopted the sovereignty reading, Justice     
Brennan approvingly cites Palmore, noting, “[t]he Court followed the same      
reasoning [as it did in Canter] when it reviewed Congress’ creation of non-Article 
III courts in the District of Columbia.”87  The Court underscored that there exists 
“no division of powers between the general and state governments” in the District 
of Columbia.88  Next, Justice Brennan briefly discusses courts-martial.  As stated 
above, these particular cases largely developed under a separate body of military 
case law.89  The Constitution grants Congress the express power to provide for 
“cases arising in the land or naval forces.”90  Lastly, Justice Brennan carefully  
defines the public rights doctrine, linking it both to separation of powers law and 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  While the distinction between public and  
private rights “has not been definitively explained in [Supreme Court] precedents,” 
the distinction between the two relies upon both the federal government’s         
sovereign immunity and either executive or legislative competence on the matter in 
issue.91 
Having laid down these three narrow exceptions to Article III, Justice Brennan 
holds, “[w]e discern no such exceptional grant of power applicable in the cases 
before us.”92  The bankruptcy courts neither “lie exclusively outside the States of 
 ________________________  
 82. Id. at 62 (“Appellants suggest two grounds for upholding the Act’s conferral of broad adjudicative 
powers upon judges unprotected by Article III.”).  Marathon first argued that “pursuant to its enumerated Article I 
powers, Congress may establish legislative courts that have jurisdiction to decide cases to which Article III judicial 
power of the United States extends.”  Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 9).  In the alternative, they argued that 
even if the Constitution required matters arising in relation to bankruptcy to be decided in an Article III court, 
“Bankruptcy jurisdiction was vested in the district court” and the exercise of jurisdiction by the “adjunct        
bankruptcy court was made subject to appeal as of right to an Article III court.”  Id. at 62-63 (quoting Brief for 
United States at 12).  
 83. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. at 64-70. 
 85. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.  
 86. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 64.  “This exception from the general prescription of Article III 
dates from the earliest day of the Republic, when it was perceived that the Framers intended that as to certain 
geographical areas, in which no State operated as sovereign, Congress was to exercise the general powers of 
government.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 87. Id. at 65 (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973)).  
 88. Id.  (quoting Kendall v. Unites States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838)).  
 89. Id. at 66; see also supra note 34.  
 90. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 14) (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make rules for the 
Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces.”).  
 91. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67-70. 
 92. Id. at 71.  
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the Federal Union, like those in the District of Columbia and the Territories.  Nor 
do the bankruptcy courts bear any resemblance to courts-martial . . . .”93  Moreover, 
“the substantive legal rights at issue in the present action cannot be deemed ‘public 
rights.’”94  Justice Brennan’s first two conclusions require no explanation.  He then 
explains that “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of 
the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-
created private rights,” such as the state law contract claim at issue in Northern 
Pipeline.95  Recognizing the expansion of the public rights doctrine, Justice    
Brennan states that issues of purely federal bankruptcy law, “may well be a ‘public 
right.’”96  Despite the fact that the government need not be a party and therefore 
would not be foregoing sovereign immunity, Justice Brennan concedes the        
possibility that under modern law, bankruptcy could be construed as a public 
right.97  Nonetheless, he firmly concludes that “Northern’s right to recover contract 
damages to augment its estate is ‘one of private rights, that is, of the liability of one 
individual to another under the law so defined.’”98 
Justice Brennan next rejects the contention that a bankruptcy judge’s            
status as an “adjunct” of the District Court could salvage the system from                        
unconstitutionality.99  Reviewing prior case law, Justice Brennan establishes “two 
principles that aid us in determining the extent to which Congress may              
constitutionally vest traditionally judicial functions in non-Article III officers.”100  
First, “when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it possesses substantial 
discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated—
including the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed by 
judges.”101  Secondly, the “functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way 
that ‘the essential attributes’ of judicial power are retained in the Article III 
court.”102  Thus, “when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has discretion” 
to provide for specific venues for the vindication of that right.103  They do not have 
such power, however, when the “right being adjudicated is not of congressional 
creation.”104  In those situations, use of a non-Article III adjudicative body raises 
the possibility of “unwarranted encroachment upon the judicial power.”105 As   
 ________________________  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  Just three years after Northern Pipeline, the court vindicated Justice Brennan’s hesitancy and 
vitiated his neat conception of the public rights doctrine.  See Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  In 
Union Carbide, the Court held that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal 
categories should inform application of Article III” and that therefore “identity of parties” should not determine 
the requirements of Article III.  Id. at 587 (citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547-48 (1962)).  
 98. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 71-72 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). 
 99. Id. at 76-77.  
 100. Id. at 80. 
 101. Id. at 80-81 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)) (“Thus Crowell recognized Art. III does 
not require ‘all determinations of fact to be made by judges.’”).  
 102. Id. at 81. 
 103. Id. at 83. 
 104. Id. at 83-84. 
 105. Id. at 84.  
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illustrated by the Northern Pipeline case itself, the Bankruptcy Act’s broad grant of 
jurisdiction “carries the possibility of such an unwarranted encroachment.”106   
Justice Brennan’s opinion suffers from three main flaws: reliance upon         
incoherent past precedent; the incorporation of the public rights doctrine; and a 
failure to justify the entire superstructure of limitations.  As illustrated by Justice 
White’s dissent, precedent provides a thicket of variegated rules.  Of equal import, 
Justice Brennan fails to justify adoption of his schema.  The cataloguing of prior 
decisional law does not justify limiting Congressional power.  Importantly, “the 
precedential value of at least two [decisions relied upon in Northern Pipeline] 
ha[ve] been seriously eroded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.”107  Justice 
Brennan not only fails to justify the use of the three exceptions he divines from 
past precedent, but he similarly fails to explain why those cases should form the 
universe of Article I courts.  This is what Justice White means when he attacks 
Justice Brennan’s lack of a “unifying principle.”108  Lastly, “the language and logic 
of Article III does not justify the public-private right dichotomy.”109  While the 
doctrine finds ample support in precedent, the dichotomy is unique in its creation 
of “bizarre” consequences,110 and failure to meaningfully limit Congressional   
discretion.111 
B.  Justice White’s Dissent: Abandoning the Defenses112 
Justice White ably dissects Justice Brennan’s simplification of prior case law; 
however, his suggestion to use a balancing test when deciding Article III cases 
amounts to an abdication of the judicial role.  After taking issue with the plurality’s 
decision to find the Bankruptcy Reform Act facially unconstitutional,113 Justice 
White attacks the plurality’s limitation on the power of Article I adjuncts.  Justice 
White asks why Justice Brennan’s two principles, drawn from prior case law,   
“define the outer limits of constitutional authority.”114  In light of the “practice in 
bankruptcy prior to 1978” and “the practice in today’s administrative agencies,” 
Justice Brennan’s guidelines amount to “unsupportable abstractions.”115            
 ________________________  
 106. Id.  
 107. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 
1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 207-08.  
 108. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 93-94 (White, J., dissenting).  
 109. Id. at 205.  
 110. Redish, supra note 107, at 208 (“But what makes the approval of the exercise of Article I court     
authority over such cases so bizarre is the contrast to the type of cases that the dichotomy dictates must be heard in 
article III courts: suits between private individuals involving state-created common law rights.”).  
 111. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White’s dissent in Northern      
Pipeline).  
 112. This paper foregoes discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence since, by its own terms, the 
concurrence seeks to avoid the broad constitutional debate dividing the plurality and the dissent. Northern     
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that if “the question presented [is the assignment of 
broad jurisdiction by the Bankruptcy Act] I would with considerable reluctance embark on the duty of deciding 
this broad question” but that since “Marathon Pipe Line Co. has not been subjected to the full range of authority 
granted bankruptcy courts” by the 1978 Act the question presented is far more limited). 
 113. Id. at 94-95 (White, J., dissenting).  
 114. Id. at 101.  
 115. Id. 
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Ultimately, Justice White probes the plurality’s reliance upon Crowell v. Benson, 
concluding that reliance on such an old case overlooked the massive changes in the 
administrative state (and bankruptcy proceedings) since 1932.116  Crowell occurred 
before decades of revolutionary administrative law cases and the expansion of the 
administrative state following the New Deal and World War II.  As such, in actual 
practice, “the additions to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judges were of      
marginal significance.”117  While fifty years of practice hardly justifies a continued 
failure to enforce Article III, Justice White perceptively undercut Justice Brennan’s 
reliance upon Crowell. 
Justice White then attacks the plurality’s neat categorization of existing case 
law, questioning both its rationale and coherence.118 Justice Brennan’s first       
exception to Article III is geographical.  As Justice White notes, “[t]he problem, of 
course, is that both of the other exceptions recognize that Article I courts can    
indeed operate within the States.”119  His second exception, for courts-martial,  
relies upon the “extraordinary control over the precise subject matter” granted to 
Congress in Article I.120  However, “[t]here is nothing in those Clauses that creates 
congressional authority different in kind from the authority granted to legislate 
with respect to bankruptcy.”121  Thus, while the first exception seems hollow, the 
second relies upon a seemingly random differentiation of Congress’ Article I   
powers.  Most problematically for Justice Brennan, in the third exception, “the 
plurality itself recognizes that Congress can create Article I courts in virtually all 
the areas in which Congress is authorized to act.”122  As such, “[t]he plurality    
opinion has the appearance of limiting Article I courts only because it fails to add 
together the sum of its parts.”123  These issues illustrate the problem of relying 
upon current precedent to cabin Congressional action. 
Justice White then raises a more sweeping point, illustrating the problems     
associated with Article III case law since Chief Justice Marshall’s invocation of the 
“judicial power” of the United States in Canter.  As mentioned above, Marshall’s 
Canter opinion leaves many questions unanswered.124  Justice White illustrates 
how these problems affected the court in Murray’s Lessee.  Having accepted    
Canter’s premise that “if the auditing of this account . . . was an exercise of the 
judicial power of the United States, the proceeding was void,” the Court was forced 
to define certain areas of law that are “judicial by nature.”125  At the same time, the 
Court had already conceded that auditing was a “judicial act.”126  These internal 
 ________________________  
 116. Id. at 100-03.  
 117. Id. at 101.  
 118. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 103-13 (discussing and attacking Justice Brennan’s analysis of 
past Article III case law).  
 119. Id. at 104.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 105.  
 124. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.  
 125. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 107-08 (citing Murray v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement 
Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855)). 
 126. Id. at 108. 
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conflicts continue to plague Article III case law, as judges must boldly pronounce 
the province of the courts while defining myriad judicial acts as having no part of 
the “judicial power” of the United States.   
In closing, Justice White argues for reading Article III as expressing a “value 
that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative    
responsibilities.”127  Noting the “complicated and contradictory history of the    
issue,” Justice White states, “[t]here is no difference in principle between the work 
that Congress may assign to an Article I court and that which the Constitution   
assigns to Article III courts.”128  While this conclusion is “inevitable” it does not 
entail “that this Court must always defer to the legislative decision” to create    
Article I courts.129  Rather, Justice White argues that despite the principled        
incantation of Alexander Hamilton in prior Article III case law, “such a balancing 
approach stands behind many of the decisions upholding Article I courts.”130  For 
example, according to Justice White, Palmore actually relied upon “legislative 
interest” rather than “any theory of territorial or geographic control.”131   
Justice White articulates two concrete ways for courts to ensure proper        
protection of the judiciary: appellate review of legislative courts in Article III   
tribunals; and by ensuring that, “Article I courts are designed to deal with issues 
likely to be of little interest to the political branches.”132  While Article III appellate 
review offers a clear practical method of controlling agencies and legislative 
courts, Justice White’s second point certainly stands at odds with the many       
important issues dealt with by the administrative state. Indeed, from the             
environment to workplace safety, Congress often leaves the most politically 
charged issues to the care of agencies.  The balancing test offered by Justice White 
provides even less guidance and coherence than Justice Brennan’s plurality       
opinion.  His test lacks any unifying principle and concludes by suggesting     
“concrete” guidelines that reflect Justice White’s personal views on the correct 
balance between the legislature and judiciary.  Despite his protestations to the   
contrary, Justice White essentially advocates abandoning the strictures of Article 
III.  A balancing test, which both heavily weights Article III appellate review and 
legislative need, will invariably result in a virtual judicial rubber stamp.  While, as 
many judges and commentators have noted, an absolutist interpretation of Article 
III may be lost to the mists of time, that does not entitle the Court to simply walk 
away from the problem.   
III. FINDING THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE 
While I disagree with Justice White’s conclusion, he did get one thing           
inescapably correct, the “Court has failed to articulate a principle” for limiting 
 ________________________  
 127. Id. at 113.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 113-14.  
 131. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 114 (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 393 (1973)). 
 132. Id. at 115.  
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Congress’ power to create legislative courts.  This section briefly considers several 
such principles before arguing that separation of powers law represents a practical, 
logically consistent manner for judging the constitutionality of legislative courts.    
A. Popular Alternatives to Northern Pipeline 
Most obviously, one could simply choose to interpret the Constitution literally.  
Fidelity to the constitutional text dictates that when Congress creates courts      
“inferior” to the Supreme Court, those courts must be staffed with Article III 
judges.  While theoretically sound and logically consistent, this approach suffers 
from one overwhelming issue: it would render any adjudication in our vast federal 
administrative apparatus unconstitutional.133 Unsurprisingly, no Justice in      
Northern Pipeline adopted the literalist approach.134  This literal interpretation, it 
seems, died in 1828. 
Considering the practical effect of congressional creation of an Article I 
court—diversion of power from the Article III judiciary—a judicial non-delegation 
doctrine might serve as a useful check on Congressional power.  The non-
delegation doctrine forms a set of “standards for determining when Congress has 
crossed the constitutional line between delegating legislative authority and simply 
allotting executive and judicial actors to carry out their constitutionally prescribed 
functions.”135  Adopting such a schema in the judicial realm would prevent      
Congress from crossing the line and delegating the “judicial power” of the United 
States to legislative or executive quasi-judicial actors.  This potential principle  
suffers from two main issues: first, the fall of the non-delegation doctrine;136 
second, the test would probably still imperil too great a percentage of Article I 
courts.  The non-delegation doctrine would likely face the same hurdles, broad-
based unpopularity and fate in the judicial realm as it did in the legislative arena.  
In CFTC v. Schor, decided only four years after Northern Pipeline, Justice 
O’Connor used an amalgam of both Justice Brennan and Justice White’s opinions 
in Northern Pipeline to create her own balancing test.137  In Schor, the Court dealt 
with the constitutionality under Article III of the Commodity Futures Trading 
 ________________________  
 133. Redish, supra note 107, at 228 (“The restrictions on the work of administrative agencies resulting from 
an absolute interpretation of article III would not only impose significant new burdens on the federal court but 
might significantly disrupt the work of the modern administrative system.”).  But see id. at 226-28 (discussing a 
possible “escape route” from declaring the work of the administrative state unconstitutional under a literal     
interpretation of Article III).   
 134. See e.g. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 93 (White, J., dissenting) (“If this simple reading were 
correct and we were free to disregard 150 years of history, these would be easy cases . . . .”); see also id. at 94 
(“[A]t this point in the history of constitutional law [this] question can no longer be answered by looking only to 
the constitutional text.”). 
 135. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54 (5th ed. 2009).  
 136. Only twice in the nation’s history, both in 1935, has the Supreme Court invalidated a statute on    
nondelegation grounds.  See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that part 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act which gave the President power to sign industry-created codes of      
competition into law, unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US. 388 
(1935) (holding that part of the National Industrial Recovery Act which allowed the President to prohibit interstate 
trade in oil produced in excess of state quotas, unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds).  
 137. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).  
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Commission, which provided reparations to individuals harmed by fraudulent   
broker conduct.138  The Commission also had jurisdiction over all counter-claims, 
including state law counter-claims.139  In upholding the validity of the Commission 
under Article III, Justice O’Connor references separation of powers concerns,140 
but ultimately articulates a multi-factor balancing test.141  She uses four factors,142 
including Justice Brennan’s adjunct-related “essential attributes of judicial power” 
language.  These factors represent an amalgam of public rights doctrine law,143 
separation of powers law,144 and the Northern Pipeline plurality.145  Justice 
O’Connor fails to buttress these four factors with any precedential support, save an 
a-contextual citation to Northern Pipeline.  Ultimately, Justice O’Connor’s       
balancing test fails to create an internally consistent, workable rule.  Interestingly, 
however, her combination and use of past precedent further illustrates the rampant 
confusion and discord in the current case law.  
B. Separation of Powers Law  
Separation of powers jurisprudence lurks beneath, and helps explain, the vast 
majority of Article III cases over the past 200 years.  Aside from providing a 
(slightly) firmer base of judicial precedent, separation of powers law can operate as 
a true check on Congressional overreach without endangering the administrative 
state.  It can both unify (to the extent possible) prior case law and provide a    
pragmatic answer to modern Article III issues.   
First, separation of powers law fits conceptually.  The Congress, in delegating 
judicial power to a legislative court, is arrogating to one of its creatures (or to an 
executive agency, in some instances) judicial power. The proper question,       
therefore, is not “what power is inherent in the judiciary” but “what delegation of 
power away from Article III tribunals violates the separation of powers doctrine.”  
A separation of powers rubric would relieve the Court of parsing the meaning of 
“judicial power,” resting precedent on firmer and more logical ground. 
Second, separation of powers doctrine can explain the vast majority of extant 
case law, particularly Murray’s Lessee and its progeny.  While Canter never     
specifically mentioned structural concerns, Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless  
 ________________________  
 138. Id. at 836.  
 139. Id. at 837. 
 140. See e.g. id. at 850 (citing the importance of the “institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch”).  
 141. Id. at 851. 
 142. Id.  Justice O’Connor’s four factors are: first, “the extent to which ‘the essential attributes of judicial 
power’ are reserved to Article III courts;” second, “the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the 
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts;” third, “the origins and importance of 
the right to be adjudicated;” and fourth, the “concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of 
Article III.”  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 143. The “origins and importance of the right” factor, constitutes a reference to public rights doctrine law as 
articulated by Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thomas v. Union  Carbide.  Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 
U.S. 568, 587 (1985)).  
 144. Specifically the first factor relates to separation of powers concerns.  Id.  
 145. Interestingly, Justice O’Connor cites to the portion of the Northern Pipeline plurality discussing  
whether the bankruptcy judges’ status as adjuncts could salvage the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978.  Id.; see also supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text. 
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implicitly argues that the Congress, as sole sovereign of the territories, properly 
exercises the full panoply of governmental powers therein.146  Specifically,      
Marshall emphasizes that Congress may create territorial courts, “in the execution 
of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United 
States.”147  As illustrated above, later case law has focused either on Congressional 
sovereignty or the transitory nature of the territorial courts at issue in Canter.  A 
different interpretation focuses on Marshall’s acknowledgement that territorial 
courts were executing a mandate incident to Congress’ plenary power over the  
territories.  While not perfect, separation of powers doctrine would leave the realm 
of the territories to congressional oversight in accord with Canter. 
In Murray’s Lessee, the reliance upon institutional competence and             
constitutional structure is far more obvious.148  Before Justice Sutherland, towards 
the very end of his opinion, lays the groundwork for the public rights doctrine, he 
discusses at length the nature of the Treasury Department.  Specifically, Congress’ 
“power to collect and disburse revenue . . . includes all known and appropriate 
means of effectually collecting and disbursing that revenue.”149  In essence,     
Congress’ power to order summary proceedings to collect revenues from Treasury 
officials is incident to their power to collect revenue.  While perhaps, as Justice 
Sutherland states, this constitutes a “judicial act” in an “enlarged sense,” this    
judicial act inheres in legislative and executive prerogative to collect revenue and 
control the Treasury Department.  Only after this discourse, in response to a      
specific argument of counsel that Congress had not in fact provided for such   
summary proceedings by statute, did Justice Sutherland discuss public and private 
rights.  At their base, both Canter and Murrays Lessee admit of clear separation of 
powers rulings, where obviously judicial acts inhere in either legislative or        
executive powers.   
Even more strikingly, modern case law consistently references structural and 
separation of powers arguments, even if they are not explicitly relied upon.  While 
Justice Brennan focuses his considerable legal acumen on synthesizing the extant 
case law, he nonetheless begins his opinion with a lengthy discussion on the     
importance of judicial independence and maintaining “the constitutional          
structure.”150  After discussing his three exceptions to Article III, Justice Brennan 
rejects the creation of “specialized legislative courts” because of “[t]he potential 
for encroachment upon power reserved to the Judicial Branch.”151 These           
arguments strike at the heart of separation of powers jurisprudence.   
Similarly, in dissent, Justice White uses separation of powers analysis to attack 
the plurality,152 but concludes by abandoning it without comment in favor of a  
 ________________________  
 146. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Murray v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-
81 (1855). 
 149. Id. at 281. 
 150. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 57-58.  
 151. Id. at 73-74.  
 152. Id. at 97-98 (White, J., dissenting) (“Initially, however, the majority’s proposal seems to turn the  
separation-of-powers doctrine, upon which the majority relies, on its head.”).  Importantly, even Justice White 
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balancing test.153  Indeed, in defending one of his “concrete” ways to protect     
Article III independence despite adherence to a balancing test, Justice White states, 
“the presence of appellate review by an Article III court will go a long way toward 
insuring a proper separation of powers.”154  Justice O’Connor in Schor, as noted 
above, similarly references separation of powers arguments before opting for a 
balancing test.155  This discussion of past case law, however, does not purport to be 
anything more than a rough fit.  As both Justices White and O’Connor noted, the 
cases do not admit of synthesis.  They do, however, bespeak a single underlying 
rationale: to protect the independence of the judiciary.  Separation of powers law 
underlies many of these decisions, not the “legislative interest” referenced by    
Justice White.  The Court must acknowledge this fact and move separation of  
powers arguments to the center of Article III law, rather than sequestering them to 
mere asides and flowery references to Hamilton and Madison. 
Despite its power as a unifying principle for this confused area of case law,  
separation of powers law suffers from a veritable two-face of judicial precedent, 
alternately supporting formalist and functionalist interpretations.156  This Achilles’ 
heel must be faced head on.  The functionalist methodology accords best with the 
extant case law, while the harsher formalist method provides a more robust       
protection of judicial independence.  While either methodology builds upon and 
improves the current body of case law, the formalist model would more forcefully 
ensure judicial independence.  A hopeful compromise would be what I term Justice 
Scalia’s “modified formalist” methodology in Mistretta v. United States.157     
Briefly, in Mistretta, the Court dealt with the Article III constitutionality of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission.158  The majority of the court, on non-delegation 
grounds, found that Congress provided a sufficient intelligible principle to the 
Commission and allowed the delegation.159   
Justice Scalia, in dissent, focuses on the separation of powers issue evident in 
creating, essentially, a “junior-varsity Congress.”160  Unlike most administrative 
agencies, the Commission exercised “no governmental power other than the     
making of laws.”161  “[T]he power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone  
other than Congress, except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or 
judicial power.”162  Applying this to the Article III context, the judicial power can 
only be exercised when it is incident to or in conjunction with the exercise of the 
  
divined the separation of powers language running through the plurality opinion, even if he disagreed with the 
Justice Brennan’s   application.  Id.  
 153. Id. at 113.  
 154. Id. at 115.  
 155. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.  
 156. See e.g. LAWSON, supra note 135 at 50-52 (collecting various Supreme Court  cases over the last three 
decades to illustrate the Court’s predilection for flip-flopping between formalism and functionalism).   
 157. 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 158. Id. at 365.  
 159. Id. at 412. 
 160. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 161. Id. at 413. 
 162. Id. at 417.  
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executive or legislative power of the United States. As such, administrative     
agencies executing the law and legislating clearly fall within this ambit.   
IV. BAPS & BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
Any schema for limiting Congressional power requires more than internal   
logical consistency and the theoretic capability to limit.  It requires actual teeth.  
Separation of powers law may seem like an appropriate manner in which to limit 
Congressional creation of Article I courts, but its adoption requires a test of both its 
accommodative and limiting capacity.  The former requires an illustration that, 
unlike a literalist interpretation of Article III, separation of powers law need not 
result in the wholesale invalidation of the current adjudicative administrative law 
structure.  The latter entails illustrating precisely when separation of powers law 
could step in and prevent creation of legislative courts.  In keeping with the subject 
matter at issue in Northern Pipeline, this section will consider two different     
components of the modern bankruptcy system: trial courts and Bankruptcy        
Appellate Panels (“BAPs”). 
A.  Bankruptcy Courts 
In the aftermath of Northern Pipeline,163 Congress faced the unenviable task of 
completely remaking the system of bankruptcy courts in the United States.164  Two 
years after Northern Pipeline, Congress finally passed the Bankruptcy       
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”) to remedy the    
unconstitutionality of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.165  The 1984 Act made 
several significant changes to prevent a second Northern Pipeline.  To begin with, 
the terminology changed.  Bankruptcy courts now constituted “units” of the district 
court, while bankruptcy judges were “judicial officer[s] of the district court.”166  
More importantly, Congress imposed a complicated limitation on the jurisdiction 
of bankruptcy judges.  Rather than having jurisdiction over all issues relating to 
Title 11 (as they did under the 1978 Act), bankruptcy judges can only adjudicate 
“core” bankruptcy proceedings.167 While a bankruptcy judge may “hear a          
 ________________________  
 163. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87; see also id. at 91 (“Because I agree with the plurality that this 
grant of authority is not readily severable from the remaining grant of authority to bankruptcy courts . . . I concur 
in the judgment.”) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).   
 164. Despite holding the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional in its entirety due to the lack 
severability of the jurisdiction-granting sections of the Act, id. at 87, 91, the Court nonetheless stayed the holding 
for several months to allow Congress the chance to salvage the 1978 Act.  Id. at 87.  Congress failed to meet the 
Court’s October deadline.   
 165. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 151.  
 167. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under Title 11 and all 
core proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title 11 . . . .”).  While a cataloguing of such 
“core” proceedings and their analysis falls outside the scope of this Article, for illustration, they include: “matters 
concerning the  administration of the estate,” id. at § 157(b)(2)(A); “counterclaims by the estate against persons 
filing claims against the estate,” id. at § 157(b)(2)(C); “proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent 
conveyances,” id. at § 157(b)(2)(H); and, “determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens,” id. at § 
157(b)(2)(K).   
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proceeding that is not a core proceeding” if it arises in relation to Title 11, the 
bankruptcy judge may not enter a final determination.  Rather, the judge must 
“submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and 
any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge” after de novo 
review.168  This system attempts to limit the jurisdiction, and therefore the power, 
of bankruptcy judges in order to satisfy the Court’s admonitions in Northern    
Pipeline.  
1.  Bankruptcy Courts under Northern Pipeline169 
Problematically for Congress, the Northern Pipeline exceptions to Article III 
do not rest upon the breadth of power granted to an Article I court, but upon the 
type of power.170  Justice Brennan demanded that Congress conform to a specific 
list of exceptions.  As such, the 1984 Act begs the question of whether Congress 
succeeded in curing the unconstitutionality of the bankruptcy system.  Since    
bankruptcy courts clearly fall within the territorial boundaries of state               
governments, they cannot be upheld under Justice Brennan’s territoriality          
exception.  Likewise, bankruptcy courts do not deal with military matters.   
To fit Justice Brennan’s schema, therefore, bankruptcy courts must adjudicate 
public rights.  If not, then while the bankruptcy system set up by the 1984 Act 
might avoid the adjudication of state law claims by Article I courts, the system 
would still not pass constitutional muster under Northern Pipeline.  Justice     
Brennan briefly dealt with this question in Northern Pipeline, noting that         
bankruptcy “may well be a public right.”171  On the other hand, Justice Brennan 
earlier quotes Crowell’s definition of public rights with approval, stating “[t]he 
doctrine extends only to matters arising ‘between the Government and a person 
subject to its authority.’”172  Under this rubric, bankruptcy would fall outside the 
scope of the public rights exception since it would not necessarily entail the      
government as a party.  In contrast, in Thomas v. Union Carbide, Justice O’Connor 
articulated a substantially looser definition of a public right.173   
Solving this question requires firmer definitions of both the scope of the public 
rights doctrine and the precise nature of bankruptcy proceedings.  This query    
illustrates the vagueness and difficulty of applying Justice Brennan’s seemingly 
rigid exceptions.  Even the seemingly clear territorial exception actually admits of 
two conflicting lines of Supreme Court interpretation, justifying Justice White’s 
 ________________________  
 168. Id. at § 157(c)(1).   
 169. While not dealt with directly herein, it is at least debatable that 1984 Act Bankruptcy Judges would fall 
under Justice Brennan’s definition of an “adjunct” of the district court.  Justice Brennan articulated two principles 
for determining whether a government officer constituted an independent judge as opposed to merely an “adjunct” 
of the district court.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  First, Congress has broad discretion to provide 
forums for the disposition of congressionally created statutory schemes.  Id.  Second, the Article III judge must 
retain “the essential attributes of the judicial power” in order for the Article I officer to constitute an adjunct. Id.   
 170. See supra Part II.B. 
 171. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 70.  
 172. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). 
 173. See supra notes 34, 98, 143 and accompanying text.  
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argument that the Northern Pipeline plurality’s neat exceptions belie their often-
conflicting underpinnings. 
2.  Bankruptcy Courts under the Separation of Powers Test 
A separation of powers test, in contrast, would not attempt to fit bankruptcy 
courts into abstract exceptions to Article III.  Rather, constitutionality would turn 
on whether or not bankruptcy courts exercised their judicial power incident to, or in 
conjunction with, their exercise of executive or legislative power.174  This Article 
argues that under this rubric, bankruptcy judges closely approximate executive 
agencies, as they decide facts and make initial legal findings.  In discovering the 
facts and applying the law as they see it, bankruptcy judges execute bankruptcy 
law.  The exercise of the judicial power, therefore, inheres in this execution of the 
bankruptcy system.  Though in the garb of judges to ensure procedural fairness, the 
bankruptcy courts administer the bankruptcy law on behalf of Congress and the 
Executive.  This administrative role does not diminish their robust legal duties, or 
the importance of those officers holding the rank of bankruptcy judge.  In contrast, 
viewing bankruptcy courts in this way clarifies their role in a nation where the  
talismanic term “judge” often portends reference to the Declaration of               
Independence.175    
Initial legal determinations in bankruptcy proceedings inhere in the              
administration of the bankruptcy code entrusted to the bankruptcy courts by     
Congress.  Rather than searching for the precise definition of “public right” or, 
indeed, the precise nature of a bankruptcy proceeding, a separation of powers test 
goes to the heart of Article III.  An Article I court may act judicially, so long as that 
power inheres (as it so often must) in the execution of the law.  Such a judicial act 
by a non-Article III actor does not offend the Constitution.  In contrast, when an 
Article I court predominantly or solely, rather than incidentally possesses judicial 
power, that grant of judicial power violates Article III.  Bankruptcy judges, as   
administrators of the bankruptcy laws must incidentally make judicial rulings.  
Article III allows them that latitude.   
B.  Bankruptcy Appellate Panels 
Along with overhauling the jurisdiction of trial level bankruptcy judges, the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“1978 Act”) also introduced several new      
bankruptcy appellate procedures in addition to traditional appeals to the district 
court.176  Most importantly, for our purposes, the 1978 Act introduced the       
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the first time.  A BAP represents an alternate    
 ________________________  
 174. See supra Part III.B. 
 175. As this Article itself illustrates, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 176. Donald A. Brittenham, Jr., The Pros and Cons Behind the First Circuit’s Decision to Establish     
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels and the Growing Question of Whether the Panels Will Last, 32 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 
215, 218-20 (1997) (discussing the establishment of BAPs and the changes in the appeal process wrought by the 
1978 Reform Act).  
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appellate structure to traditional appeals to the district court, where a panel of three 
bankruptcy judges sits to decide the appeal.  In order to comply with the perceived 
deficiencies in the BAP legislation under Northern Pipeline, the 1984 Act made 
minor alterations to the existing BAP structure.177  Up to that point, only the Ninth 
Circuit maintained a BAP.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (“1994 Act”) 
marked a major shift in the history of BAPs and governs their current structure.178  
The Act provides that the “judicial council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy 
appellate panel,”179 making BAPs mandatory for the first time.  BAPs will consist 
of three bankruptcy judges of a circuit “except that a member of such service may 
not hear an appeal originating in the district for which such member is               
appointed.”180  The 1994 Act thus mandates BAPs, seeming to express a strong 
congressional preference for re-routing appeals from the district court. 
Despite this seemingly absolute command, the 1994 Act provides several    
methods for refusing to employ a BAP in a given circuit.  First, a judicial council 
need not establish a BAP if it finds that “there are insufficient judicial resources 
available in the circuit; or establishment of such service would result in undue  
delay or increased cost to parties in cases under title 11.”181  A judicial council can 
make these findings at any time, even after the creation of a BAP.182  Moreover, 
even if the judicial council fails to make one of the above findings, district judges 
must ratify the use of the BAP for cases originating in their district by majority 
vote.183  Lastly, the 1994 Act provides an opt-out provision for litigants.184       
Nonetheless, the 1994 Act still provides a clear congressional preference for 
routing bankruptcy appeals away from district courts to a three person panel of 
bankruptcy judges unless practicality or judicial resistance counsel otherwise.185   
The question of whether BAPs comply with Northern Pipeline, poses the same 
problems confronted in the previous section, when discussing trial level bankruptcy 
courts.186  Justice Brennan’s schema does not involve the type of power exercised 
by a given Article I judge.187  Rather, he focuses upon the type of matter cognizable 
in the court.188 The extent of a court’s jurisdiction only becomes important        
insomuch as it indicates the category of cases the court may act upon.  Under 
Northern Pipeline, BAPs pass constitutional muster so long as bankruptcy        
 ________________________  
 177. Id. 
 178. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).   
 179. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. at § 158(b)(5). 
 181. Id. at § 158(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
 182. Id. at § 158(b)(2)(A)-(D).  
 183. Id. at § 158(b)(6). 
 184. Id. at § 158(c)(1) (stating that upon timely election the appeal may be heard by the district court).   
 185. But see Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1995) (“The fact that Congress provided for these exceptions [to the mandatory establishment of a 
BAP] indicates its realization that BAPs may not be suitable because they could not be sustained economically.”).  
 186. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline); see also supra Part IV.A.1 
(discussing the constitutionality of current trial level bankruptcy judges under Northern Pipeline).   
 187. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 188. Id. 
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constitutes a public right.189  As noted above, this question comes fraught with 
complexity.190  The fact that the Northern Pipeline schema would treat bankruptcy 
courts and BAPs as functionally equivalent seriously undermines the efficacy and 
value of the case.    
Unlike bankruptcy courts, which apply law to fact in the process of              
administering the bankruptcy code, BAPs primarily decide issues of legal         
interpretation.  While BAP decisions have only debatable precedential value,191 
they at minimum bind the parties subject to their judgment.  While parties may 
then appeal to the court of appeal,192 many cases may be the subject of trial and 
appellate review in solely Article I courts.193  The dearth of binding precedential 
value in BAP decisions does not assist their constitutionality.  Whatever the fate of 
a given decision after the end of litigation, in the case before them, a                 
BAP interprets and declares the law.  To quote Chief Justice Marshall’s famous         
incantation from Marbury v. Madison, BAPs “say what the law is,” a               
quintessentially judicial function.194   
Unlike trial level bankruptcy courts, BAPs fail to pass constitutional muster 
under the separation of powers test.  Rather than primarily aiding in the direct   
administration of the bankruptcy code, BAPs focus upon legal interpretation.  Like 
most appellate courts, BAPs give deference on factual issues to the trial court, 
while reviewing questions of law de novo.  BAPs turn the roles of bankruptcy 
courts on their heads.  Their executive power, their direct administration of the 
bankruptcy code, inheres in their overriding law-declaration and clarification    
duties.  This definitely tilts the balance under the “modified functionalist”         
separation of powers test discussed above.  BAPs represent a junior varsity       
appellate court.  While of limited jurisdiction relative to the courts of appeal, extent 
of jurisdiction does not cure the constitutional deficiency.  Creation of a solely 
judicial body, with minimal executive, administrative or legislative duties,        
unconstitutionally circumvents the strictures of Article III and the Constitution.   
 ________________________  
 189. One difference between trial level bankruptcy courts and BAPs, as institutions, is that BAPs almost 
certainly cannot avail themselves of “adjunct” to the district court arguments, see supra notes 100-07 (discussing 
Justice Brennan’s adjunct analysis); see also In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 30 B.R. 56, 62 (Bankr. 
1st Cir. 1983) (holding the First Circuit’s BAP unconstitutional under Northern Pipeline) vacated sub nom.     
Massachusetts v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984) (declining to reach the   
constitutional issue decided by the BAP, but noting that Northern Pipeline “suggests a serious question regarding 
the constitutionality of bankruptcy appellate panels”).  But see, In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981, 985-87 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding the Ninth Circuit’s BAP constitutional under Northern Pipeline’s “adjunct” analysis).  
 190. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.  
 191. See e.g., Wiseman, supra note 185, at 10 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s method of dealing with the 
precedential value of BAP decisions).   
 192. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (“The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, 
judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.”).  
 193. Wiseman, supra note 185, at 11 (noting that “decisions of the BAP from which no appeal is taken to 
the circuit court escape[s] any Article III review”).  
 194. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”).  Interestingly, Chief Justice Marshall then notes that “[t]hose who apply the rule to  
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”  Id.  This statement helps to illustrate the 
difference between the administration of the bankruptcy code by trial level bankruptcy judges and the purely   
interpretive role of the BAPs.  
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The difference between BAPs and trial level bankruptcy courts illustrates the 
potential of separation of powers doctrine to protect the integrity of Article III, 
while allowing Congress leeway to efficiently and effectively administer the vast 
federal apparatus.  
CONCLUSION 
Separation of powers doctrine presents a workable manner for deciding when a 
court must comport with the strictures of Article III.  When a court actuates an  
executive or legislative function, the courts need not comply with Article III.  If, 
however, a court simply adjudicates without any executive or legislative function, 
that court is solely exercising the judicial power of the United States and Article III 
governs.  This line creates a relatively definitive test for Congress, without either 
endangering the current administrative state or preventing Congressional          
flexibility.  Moreover, despite its flexibility, separation of powers law does create a 
true limit on Congress’ power to create Article I courts, helping to ensure the    
continued potency and independence of the Article III judiciary.  
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